Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

Dan Rodney Joos v. Piper C. Joos (Monte) : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald C. Barker; Attorney for Appellant.
Ephraim H. Fankhauser; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Dan Rodney Joos v. Piper C. Joos (Monte), No. 20011005 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3606

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—000O000—-

DAN RODNEY JOOS,

)

Petitioner and Appellant,
vs.

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 20011005-CA

)

PIPER C. JOOS (MONTE),

)

Respondent and Appellee. )

Third District Court,
Judge Tyrone Medley

—000O000—

APPEAL - APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

E.H. Fankhauser, Esq., #1032
Attorney for Appellee
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)534-1148
FAX:
(801)531-7928

Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Attorney for Appellant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone:
(801) 486-9636
FAX:
(801) 486-5754
E-mail:
rcb(g)xmission.com

'-69
>Jourt

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities

II

I Introduction

1

II. Reply to Section IV of Piper's Response
Statement of the Case

1

III. Reply to Section VI of Piper's Response
Statement of Facts

3

IV. Reply to Section VI and VII of Piper's Response
Response to "Argument"

10

V. Conclusion & Relief

22

Certificate of Service

24

/

Table of Authorities
Cases
State ex rel B. B., 45 P.2d 527, ^f 10

3

Bookside Mobile Home Park, v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, f 14-15 (Utah 2002)
Brown v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)

3
17

Hopfmann v Connolly (1985) 471 US 459, 85 L Ed 2d 469, 105 S Ct 2106
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2D 508, 517 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996)

5
22

Maryland v Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. (1950) 338 US 912, 94 L Ed 562,
70 S Ct 252

5

Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2D 297 (1953)

17

Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002)

16

Polites v United States (1960) 364 US 426, 5 L Ed 2d 173, 81 S Ct 202

5

Roberson v. Draney, 182 P. 212, 213 (1919)

3

Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005 (2001)

4, 7, 14, 15, 17, 23

State ex rel S.A., 37 P.3d 1166, f 5 (Ut Ct. App. 2001)

6, 8, 11

Teague v Lane (1989) 489 US 288, 103 L Ed 2d 334, 109 S Ct 1060,
reh den 490 US 1031, 104 L Ed 2d 206, 109 S Ct 1771
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 395 P.2d 62 (1964)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed2d 49 (2000)

5
17
passim

U.K.P.C, Inc. v. R. O. A. Gen., Inc., 990 P.2d 945 (Ut App. 1999)

3

United States v Carver (1923) 260 US 482, 67'L Ed 361, 43 S Ct 181
II

5

Rule 11 URCP

passim

Rule 3(d) URAP

10, 11

Rule 4-508 RofJA

4

Rule 4-506 RofJA

21

Rule 59 URCP

2, 3, 10, 20, 21

Rule 60(b) URCP

17

URCP, Form 1

2

Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1275(a)

12

Utah Code § 30-3-3 (1995)

24

Other Authorities
U. S. Constitution Art. IV §2

8, 9

U. S. Constitution Article III, § 2

12

III

I INTRODUCTION
Petitioner and Appellant, Dan Rodney Joos ("DAN") replies to the Respondent Piper
C. Joos's (Monte) ("PIPER") Appellee's Brief as follows. In an effort to identify Piper's
argument to which he is responding, Dan has generally used Piper's § designations and f
numbers. Paragraphs*which do not contain new material to which a response is required
have been omitted.
II. REPLY TO SECTION IV OF PIPER'S RESPONSE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Troxelv. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,120 S. Ct. 2054,147 L.Ed2d 49 (2000), changed
the law. Dan's declaratoryjudgment lawsuit sought a determination that Utah's divorce laws
were rendered unconstitutional by Troxel, supra. It was dismissed on summary judgment
by Judge Medley, who also imposed URCP 11 sanctions against Dan because the Court
concluded [R. 238-243] that his claims were allegedly res judicata as a result of this Court's
11/4/99 decision [App. A-1 to Piper's brief], and his unsuccessful petitions for writs of
certiorari. Dan argued that the intervening decision in Troxel supra., changed the law and
thus avoided issue preclusion which otherwise might have prevented him for re-litigating that
issue.1

1

See discussion in § VII, Issue I Res Judicata, P. 41 in Dan's opening brief.
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Appeal Includes Summary Judgment Order
2. Dan's appeal from the "entire judgment" included the summary judgment
order. Piper's attempts to limit the scope of Dan's appeal [pp. 8 & 16] are misplaced. The
Notice of Appeal in this case also included the following general statement as to the scope
of the appeal, which is sufficiently broad to preserve the issues argued by Dan in his opening
brief. Although not identified by date, the only "judgment" in this case is the Court 10/15/01
Order re the 7/30/01 hearing. Dan's Notice of Appeal [R. 265] included the following
statement as to the scope of Dan's appeal:

The appeal is taken from the entire judgment
(Emphasis added).
3. Dan's notice of appeal followed URAP and is adequate. Paragraph 2a in the
Notice of Appeal in the URCP, Form 1 suggests that exact wording. The fact that Dan also
identified the order denying his URCP 59 motion does not limit the scope of the issues
involved in this appeal. Contrary to Piper's argument [pp. 5 & 16], the "entire judgment"
herein, including the Court's 10/15/01 Order concerning the 7/30/01 hearing, is properly
before the Court for purposes of this appeal.
URCP 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
4. Dan's URCP 59(e) motion included issues involved in the underlying summary
judgment. Dan filed his URCP 59(e) motion pro se. Although not a model of legal
draftsmanship, Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion included essentially all of the underlying claims
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raised by Dan in this appeal, including such things as whether Utah divorce laws are rendered
unconstitutional by Troxel, supra, whether URCP 11 sanctions were justified, etc. An
appellant need not raise issue more than once at the trial court level to preserve them for an
appeal.2 In \ 10 of its 11/14/01 Findings [R. 254-260], the Court specifically adopted its
10/15/01 Order re the 7/30/01 hearing, *so an appeal from that Order includes an appeal from
the 10/15/01 Order mentioned therein.

Further, the Docketing Statement, which

supplemented the Notice of Appeal, also set forth in detail the issues involved in the appeal.
Piper could not have been misled as to the issues involved in this appeal. Even if the issues
on appeal were limited to denial of Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion (which we deny), Dan's
URCP 59(3) motion was sufficiently broad to include all of the issues raised by Dan on
appeal. Notices of Appeal are to be liberally construed.3
III. REPLY TO SECTION VI OF PIPER'S RESPONSE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
5. Dan's action sought declaration that parental constitutional rights defined in
Troxelj supra are binding on Utah divorce courts. Dan reaffirms the Statement of Facts
in his opening brief [P. 17-20]. Dan denies Piper's claim, that he is attempting to re-litigate
the divorce action. Instead, his declaratory judgement lawsuit sought a ruling that the
intervening decision in Troxel, supra changed the law, avoided the issue preclusion which
2

Bookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, f 14-15 (Utah 2002).

3

Roberson v. Draney, 182 P. 212, 213 (1919); State ex relB. B., 45 P.2d 527, ^
10; U.K.P.C., Inc. v. R. O. A. Gen., Inc., 990 P.2d 945 (Ut App. 1999).
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would otherwise have resulted from this Court's 11/4/99 decision [App. A-l to Piper's brief],
which allowed him to litigate the new issue as to the effect of Troxel, supra, on the
constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. The events in the Utah Courts cited by Piper in
support of her res judicata argument, all occurred in 1997, 1998 and 1999. But for the
intervening U. S. Supreme Court's Troxel v. Granville decision in 20004 and the 2001
decision in Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005 (2001) Piper's res judicata arguments5
and Judge Medley's decision might have merit and Dan's Declaratory Judgment action might
be barred by issue preclusion.

Dan acknowledges that in its 11/4/99 unpublished

Memorandum Decision [which has little or no precedential effect]6 this court held that Utah's
divorce laws are constitutional. That decision also mentioned Res judicata .7 However, as

"Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
5

See discussion in §VI, 1 1 , P. 41 entitled "Res Judicata does not apply", of Dan's
Opening Brief.
6

Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions. Rule 4-508 reads in relevant part as follows:

Intent:
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value and shall
not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of applying the
doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
(3) For the purposes of this rule, any memorandum decision, per curiam opinion, or
other disposition of the Court designated "not for official publication'1 shall be regarded
as an unpublished opinion. (Emphasis added).
7

A copy of this Court's 11/4/99 Memorandum Decision is in Piper's Addendum.
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discussed in Dan's Opening Brief,8 the Troxel, supra decision changed the law and
extinguished Piper's issue preclusion {resjudicata) argument. Piper's argument seems to be
that Dan's petitions to the U. S. Supreme Court seeking a writ of certiorari somehow had a
res judicata effect. That argument is erroneous. See discussion in \ 6 below.
6. Denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari has no res judicata effect. The
essence of Piper's argument appears to be that Dan's unsuccessful petitions for writs of
certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and to the United States Supreme Court had res judicata
affect lacks merit. Denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits and
it does not have any res judicata effect.9
7. Parental constitutional rights defined in Troxel, supra, apply to Utah divorces.
Piper's attempts to narrowly limit the effect of Troxel, supra are not supported by the
holdings in Troxel, supra or in later cases which have relied on Troxel, supra. For example,

8

See discussions in | A, B, C, P. 1-2; f 1-3, P. 15-16; f 2, P. 17; % 1-2, P. 20-22;
§ VI, P. 24-29, in Dan's Opening Brief.
9

See discussion in 12(e), P. 4-5 of Piper's Brief. United States v Carver (1923) 260 US 482,
67 L Ed 361, 43 S Ct 181; Maryland v Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. (1950) 338 US 912, 94
L Ed 562, 70 S Ct 252; Polites v United States (1960) 364 US 426, 5 L Ed 2d 173, 81 S Ct
202; league v Lane (1989) 489 US 288, 103 L Ed 2d 334, 109 S Ct 1060, reh den 490 US
1031, 104LEd2d206, 109 SCt 1771; Yee vEscondido (1992, US) 1 1 8 L E d 2 d l 5 3 , 112
S Ct 1522. Hopfmann v Connolly (1985) 471 US 459, 85 L Ed 2d 469,105 S Ct2106; denial
of certiorari imported no expression of opinion upon merits of case, and opinions
accompanying denial of certiorari could not have same effect as decisions on merits, Teague
v Lane (1989) 489 US 288, 103 L Ed 2d 334, 109 S Ct 1060, reh den 490 US 1031, 104 L
Ed 2d 206, 109 S Ct 1771 [Per Justice O'Connor, with the Chief Justice and two Justices
concurring, and three Justices concurring in part and concurring in judgment].
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in State ex rel S.A.,10 a case involving "a sibling at risk" case, this Court expanded the
holding in Troxel, supra, well beyond third-party visitation situations to which Piper attempts
to limit the Troxel, supra decision.11 Among other things, this Court held that the Troxel,
supra decision established a constitutional right of parents to the care, custody and control
of their children and to due process concerning those rights. At P. 1168, If 5 of its decision
in State ex rel S. A., supra, this Court cited Troxel, supra as follows:
The liberty interest at issued in this case-the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.
(Emphasis added).
8. Whether the decision in Troxel, supra binds Utah Divorce Courts has not been
ruled upon by the Utah Appellate Courts. The Utah Appellant Courts have not ruled as
to the effect ofTroxel, supra on the constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. Dan had a right
to ask them to do so. Judge Medley erred when he imposed sanctions upon Dan, a pro se
litigant, for asking the Utah Courts to rule on that constitutional issue. Judge Medley's
conclusion that Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit was barred by res judicata12 was in error
because Troxel, supra, was decided after Dan's prior appeals.13 If as argued by
10

State ex relS.A., 37 P.3d 1166, \ 5 (Ut Ct. App. 2001).

11

State ex rel SA.} 37 P3d 1166 at H 4 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001) and quotation therefrom
found on page 18 of Dan's Opening Brief herein.
12

Tf 1, P. 4 of Judge Medley's 10/15/01 Conclusions of Law re summary judgment
motion [R. 238-243].
13

The chronology of relevant events in this matter is as follows [Dan's unsuccessful petition's
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for writs of certiorari to the Utah and U.S. Supreme Courts are omitted because, as discussed
in f 6, P. 5 above, denial of a writ of certiorari has no precedential effect] :
11/7/96

Divorce decree entered.

9/25/97

In case #960720CA the Ut. Ct. App. affirmed the divorce
decree.

11/4/99

In case #990666CA the Ut. Ct. App. affirmed the lower court.
In that case, among other things, Dan unsuccessfully challenged
the constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. This Court held:
"We reject appellant's contention that the divorce statutes are
vague and overbroad or violate equal protection guarantees." [A
copy of that decision is attached as Appendix A-l to Piper's
Brief].

6/5/00

The U. S. Supreme Court decided Troxel v. Granville, supra,
which among other things, recognized fit parents'
constitutionally protected right to determine the "care, custody
and control of their children." Because the Troxel, supra
decision constituted a change in the law, this Court's 9/25/97
and 11/4/99 decisions (mentioned above) were, in effect
overruled, they no longer had res judicata effect and Dan was
no longer thereby prevented from challenging the
constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. [See discussion in 1 1 ,
P. 1 above].

2/15/01

Ut. Ct. App. ignored the Troxel, supra decision and its
declaration of fit parent's constitutional rights to the "care,
custody and control of their children", and instead ruled in
Shinkoskeyv. Shinkoskey, 19P.3d 1005,1007-1008, that "by the
plain language of the statute, divorce courts have jurisdiction
over 'children'" and that the power of the judge to be the
decision-maker over the children is absolute with "no hint of
limitation." The Shinkoskey, supra, decision ignored the U. S.
Constitution's federal supremacy clause, and is absolutely
inconsistent with the Troxel, supra decision. In his declaratory
judgment action, Dan seeks to resolve this obvious
Page 7 of 24 - Dan's Reply Brief

Dan, Troxel, supra, had the effect of overruling this Court's decisions holding that Utah's
divorce laws to be constitutional, Troxel, supra, is binding on the Utah divorce courts.14
Judge Medley also erred when in part he held that: [| 2 of Conclusions of Law, R. 238-243].
denial of the Petitions for Certiorari by the Utah Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court are res judicata
to the issues in this action. (Emphasis added).
As discussed in \ 1, P. 1, 16, P. 5 and in footnote 9, P. 5 above, denial of a petition for a writ
of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits and is not res judicata as to the issues addressed in
those petitions.
9. Under Federal Supremacy, Troxel, supra, is binding on Utah Divorce Courts.
Art. IV(2) of the U. S. Constitution makes Federal Law constitutional and statutory laws the

inconsistency and for this Court to recognize parents5
constitutionally protected right to determine the "care, custody
and control of their children."
5/5/01

Dan filed this action seeking declaratory judgment which,
among other things, merely asked the Court to apply Troxel,
supra with respect to Utah's divorce laws by recognizing and
honoring fit parents' constitutionally protected right to
determine the "care, custody and control of their children" and
imposing reasonable constitutional limits on the power of judges
to override fit parents' decisions concerning their children.

10/18/01

Ut. Ct. App. decided State ex rel S. A, supra, a "sibling at risk"
case" in which [37 P.3d 1166,1168, f 12] this Court recognized
a father's "protected interest" in his child and cited Troxel,
supra with approval.

See discussion in § VII, Issue I Res Judicata, P. 41 in Dan's opening brief.
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supreme law of the land and mandates that all state judges "shall be bound thereby."15 The
Troxel, supra decision is the supreme law of the land and this Court is bound thereby.
Without being sanctioned for asserting his constitutional rights, URCP 11(b)(2) specifically
authorized Dan to make:
a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modifications or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.
(Emphasis added).
Dan's arguments were proper and appropriate. Sanctions were erroneously imposed upon
him by the trial court. Those sanctions should be vacated.
10. Denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not res judicata. As discussed
in \ 6 above, denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari has no precedential or res judicata
effect. Piper's contrary argument and Judge Medley's ruling are simply wrong.
11. Piper's generalized arguments should be disregarded. Without identifying
specific items, Piper generally alleges that Dan's brief contains "contradictory or misleading
statements", that "quotes from cases are taken out of context" and that the cases cited are
allegedly "clearly distinguishable" [P. 12]. Although it is of little importance in this appeal,

15

Art. IV(2) of the U. S. Constitution reads in relevant part as follows:
(2) This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the judges of every state shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (Emphasis
added).
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Piper argues that the reason given for Dan's attorney's withdrawal [illness] is allegedly
hearsay [P. 12]. Piper's contraiy claims as to the reason for withdrawal of Dan's attorney are
also hearsay [P. 6 & 12]. Whatever the reason for the withdrawal, it is undisputed that Dan's
attorney withdrew on 3/21/02, which was the same day that Piper's attorney mailed her
URCP 11 motion [P.6]. He withdrew before receipt of Piper's URCP 11 motion.
IV. REPLY TO SECTION VI AND VII OF PIPER'S RESPONSE
RESPONSE TO "ARGUMENT"
12. Dan's response includes cross-references. In the interest of brevity Dan makes
a joint response to Piper's § VII "Summary of Arguments" and VIII "ARGUMENT". In
instances where Piper's arguments have been addressed in whole or in part a in prior section
of this brief, Dan sometimes refers to the page where those matters are discussed. Dan's
argument is generally in the same order as Piper's arguments in her brief, as follows:
13. Dan's notice of appeal fully complied with URAP 3(d) and is adequate to
confer jurisdiction on this Court. Piper makes the curious argument [P. 16] that because
the Notice of Appeal specifically identified the Order denying Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment, that the issues on appeal are allegedly: (1) limited to the Court's
denial of that Motion [R. 244-246] and (2) that his appeal does not include the Court's
10/15/01 Summary Judgment Order [R. 244-245]. To the contrary, as discussed in more
detail above [P. 1-3], Dan's Notice of Appeal also specifically states that "The appeal is
taken from the entire judgment." This is the precise wording specified in ^f 2a of URAP
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"Notice of Appeal/' Form 1, and as a matter of law is sufficient to include the Court's
10/15/01 Order re summary the judgment motions [R. 238-245]. Dan fully complied with the
requirements of URAP 3(d), which states that a notice of appeal "shall designate the
judgment or order, or part thereof appealed from." The terms "entire judgment" is broad
enough to include the Court's summary judgment order. Piper's argument lacks merit and
candor.
Fit parents9 right to control their children
14. The Troxel, supra decision affirms parents' constitutionally protected right
to make decisions concerning the "care, custody and control of their children" without
state interference. See discussion in 15, P. 3-5 above. Contraryto Piper's argument [P. 1619], the Troxel, supra decision is not limited to third-party and grandparent visitation rights.
As noted above [Par 7, P. 5], in State ex rel S. A.,16 this Court has applied Troxel, supra in
non-third-party proceedings, in litigation involving a "sibling at risk" case. This Court cited
Troxel, supra concerning the constitutional rights of parents to control their children. Dan
has a right to have this Court rule as to the constitutional effect on Utah's divorce laws which
flow from Troxel, supra.
U.S. Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction re visitation
15. Troxel, supra, concerns a state's unconstitutional denial of fit parents'
constitutional right to control their children. Troxel, supra concerns the State of

16

State ex rel S.A., 37 P.3d 1166, f 5 (Ut Ct. App. 2001).
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Washington having denied a fit parent's constitutional right to make decisions concerning
and right to govern her children. It is not about grandparent visitation rights, although those
rights were the catalyst which resulted in the appeal.
16. U. S. Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to decide visitation rights. As stated
in P. 170 of the Record, the U. S. Supreme Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Except
to the extent that a parent's constitutional rights are denied, the U. S. Supreme Court does
not have jurisdiction to decide state court visitation rights.17 It is barred by federal law from
"addressing visitation rights of third parties and grandparents." As noted by Piper [P. 19],
because it lacked jurisdiction to do so, the U. S. Supreme Court did not address custody,
visitation, support, health insurance, division of property, etc. However, it did properly
address whether the Washington Statute was repugnant to parents' constitutional rights. In
Troxel, supra, the U. S. Supreme Court concluded that the state court's granting of visitation
rights to grandparents violated "perhaps one of the oldest of fundamental liberty interests,"
the parent's constitutional rights regarding the "care, custody and control of their children."
[Quoted in ^ 7 above]. Piper's argument that the Troxel, supra court "addressed visitation
rights of third parties and grandparents and did not encompass the Washington divorce

17

Art. Ill, § 2 of the U. S. Constitution gives federal courts limited jurisdiction "as the
Congress shall make." 28 U.S.C. § 1275(a) allows the U. S. Supreme Court to grant
certiorari for:
1. Federal law validity.
2. State statute validity "on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution." (Emphasis added)
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statutes" misses the point and is wrong. As discussed above [Par. 15 & 16], the U. S.
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address state court visitation rights. Instead, in Troxel,
supra, the U. S. Supreme Court addressed fit parent's constitutional right to make decisions
concerning the "care, custody and control of their children" without state interference.
Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit quite properly asked the Court to determine whether fit
Utah parents constitutional right to make decisions concerning the "care, custody and control
of their children" without state interference are also constitutionally protected from Utah
divorce statutes which are repugnant to said parental constitutionally protected rights as
defined in the Troxel, supra decision.
Troxel supra, supports Dan's argument
17. Piper's quotations from Troxel supra, support Dan's but not her arguments.
Piper quoted extensively from Troxel, supra, in an effort to show that Dan's argument re
parental constitutional rights to control their children is allegedly frivolous.18 Her quotations
do not support Piper's argument. Instead, as demonstrated below, the Troxel, supra language
quoted by Piper supports Dan's arguments regarding fit parents' constitutional rights to
control the "care, custody and control of their children":
(a)

Language quoted by Piper: [Page 17]

"Washington's breathtakingly broad statute effectively permits a court to
disregard and overturn any decision by afitcustodial parent concerning visitation

18

See single line quotation of about 1 Vi pages from Troxel, supra, at P. 17-18 in
Piper's Brief.
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whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely
on the judge's determination of the child's best interest. A parent's estimation of
the child's best interest is accorded no deference... The problem here is •.. that
(the Court) gave no special weight to Granville's determination of her daughter's
best interest. More importantly, that court appears to have applied the opposite
presumption, favoring grandparent visitation. In affect, it placed on Granville the
burden of disproving that visitation would be in her daughter's best interest and
thus failed to provide any protection for her fundamental right. . . . These
factors, . . . show . . . that the visitation order was an unconstitutional
infringement on Granville's right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her
children." (Emphasis added).
(b) Dan's response:
Utah Courts should have, but have not, applied Troxel, supra,, as a limitation on
divorce judges power to override decisions by fit parents concerning their children. As
discussed in ^f footnote 13, supra; in ^f 2 and 3 in the "Statement of Facts," P. 17-18 of Dan's
opening brief, in Shinkoskey, supra, this Court held that "by the plain language of the statute,
divorce courts have jurisdiction over 'children'" and that the power of the judge to be the
decision-maker is absolute with "no hint of limitation."

Utah's 2/15/02 decision in

Shinkoskey, supra, unconstitutionally gives the divorce judge almost unlimited power to
disregard and overrule fit parents' decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their
children. In the Shinkoskey, supra decision, this Court appears to have ignored the 6/5/00
U. S. Supreme Court's Troxel, supra decision and parental constitutional rights to control
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their children as defined therein, to have ignored the fact that this Court is bound by Federal
Constitutional Law, etc.19
(c) The broad discretion given to Utah judges to override fit parent's decisions
is also unconstitutionally breathtakingly broad. Contrary to Piper's argument, the
Shinkoskey, supra decision does not support her argument. Instead, the language quoted by
Piper supports Dan's argument that Utah divorce laws are unconstitutional, that his
arguments were not frivolous, and that URCP 11 sanctions were improperly imposed. Like
the "breathtakingly broad" Washington grandparent visitation statute involved in Troxel,
supra, under this Court's Shinkoskey, supra decision Utah divorce judges also have almost
unlimited ("breathtakingly broad") discretion to overrule decisions by fit parents concerning
control of their children.
Denial of petitions for certiorari is not res judicata
18. Denial of writs of certiorari is not an adjudication on the merits. As
discussed in f 2, P. 3 above, denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari to either the Utah or
U. S. Supreme Courts is not an adjudication on the merits, does not have res judicata effect,
and does not prevent Dan from seeking a ruling as to the constitutional effect on Utah's
divorce laws which flow from Troxel, supra. But for the later (intervening) U. S. Supreme
Court decision in the constitutional effect on Utah's divorce laws which flow from Troxel,

19

See discussion in f 9 and footnote 15, P. 8-9 above, re the Federal Supremacy
clause of the U. S. Constitution and its specific binding effect upon state court judges.
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supra,, Piper's argument that the prior decision of this Court upholding the constitutionality
of Utah's divorce laws was probably res judicata and Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit,
might have been barred. However, as discussed in § VI, f 5, P. 3-5 above, an unresolved
substantial legal issue remained as to whether the intervening decision in Troxel, supra, had
the effect of overruling those prior decisions of this court. If so, whether the prior res
judicata effect of this Court's 11/4/99 decision [App. A-1 to Piper's Brief] continued to exist
was an open question which allowed Dan a "non-frivolous" right to again challenge to the
constitutionality of Utah Divorce laws based upon the effect of the later decision in Troxel,
supra. Because this was a substantial issue of law not yet decided by Utah Appellate Courts,
Dan's attempt to obtain such a ruling was neither "frivolous" or sanctionable.
Marshaling of evidence not required
19. Because of summary judgment evidence Dan need not martial evidence.
Instead evidence is construed in light most favorable to Dan. Piper makes the curious
argument that Dan failed to perform his alleged duty to marshal evidence [P. 20]. In support,
Piper cited Neeley,20 an appeal from a jury verdict, where the appellant had failed to martial
evidence in support of the jury verdict [P. 20]. Because in the present case a summary
judgment was involved, there was no trial and no evidence to martial. Instead of a
presumption of validity of the jury verdict as existed in Neeley, supra, in our case "all
evidence and all reasonable inference fairly to be drawn therefrom (are to be surveyed by the

20

Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002).
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court) in the light most favorable to him" (Dan).21 In any event, the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered concerning the Motion for Summary Judgment22 is a martial of
evidence which Piper believed supported her claims. Nothing could be accomplished by Dan
again repeating that summary.
Dan's URCP 60(b) action was timely
20. Dan's URCP 60(b) action was timely filed. Piper incorrectly argues that Dan's
URCP 60(b) Motion was untimely because it was filed approximately 4 years after the
divorce decree [P. 21]. After this Court's 11/4/99 decision in Case #990666 [App. A-l to
Piper's brief], held that Utah's divorce laws were not unconstitutional, the principal of res
judicata barred Dan from again challenge the constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws. It was
not until the 6/5/00 Troxel, supra decision that Dan could again challenge the
constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws because res judicata no longer applied if, as argued
by Dan, the law had changed.23 Dan's declaratory lawsuit was filed 3/5/01, about 8 months
after the 6/5/00 U.S. Supreme Court's decision which recognized parental constitutional
rights concerning decisions regarding their children in Troxel, supra. This gave Dan a new
opportunity to challenge. Dan filed his appeal less than a month after this Court's ruling in
its 2/15/01 Shinkoskey, supra decision, in which this Court failed to consider the effect of

21

Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2D 297 (1953); Thompson v. Ford Motor
Co., 395 P.2d 62 (1964); Brown v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).
22

R. 238-246.

23

See discussion in 11, P. 41 of Dan's opening brief.
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Troxel, supra, and held that divorce courts have almost absolute discretion to overrule
decisions made by fit parents concerning their children. Therefore, Dan's declaratory
judgment lawsuit is not barred by laches as argued by Piper [P. 21].
URCP 11 sanctions should be vacated
21. URCP 11 authorized Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit, asking the Court
to rule on constitutional effect on Utah's divorce laws, from the Troxel, supra decision.
Contrary to Piper's argument [| 3 & 4, P. 11-12], and as discussed in f 9, P. 9 above, URCP
11 specifically allowed Dan to seek a declaration from the Court as to the legal effect on
Utah's divorce laws which flow from Troxel, supra. Piper's argument and Judge Medley's
ruling that denial of Dan's petitions for writs of certiorari resulted in a res judicata and/or
issue preclusion are clearly without merit. See discussion in Par. 6 and 10 above.
22. URCP 11 sanctions may not be imposed because "safe harbor" opportunity
was not given to Dan. Piper did not comply with the safe harbor provisions in URCP
11(c)(1)(A), which compliance is a condition precedent to imposition of sanctions.24 Dan's
declaratory judgment action and supporting arguments were reasonable, plausible issues he
raised have not been ruled upon by Utah's appellate Courts, and are substantial issues of law
which should be decided by this Court. URCP 11(b)(2) specifically allowed Dan to attempt
to clarify the effect Troxel, supra on Utah's divorce laws and/or to change those laws,
without being subject to sanctions. Imposition of sanctions under these circumstances is

24

See discussion in ^f 1 and 2, P. 38-39 in Dan's Opening Brief.
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against public policy. Among other things, such a ruling would have a chilling effect upon
the willingness of a party or his attorney to challenge existing law and/or to change or make
new law. The "safe harbor" provisions in URCP 11 are designed to give an offending party
a chance to correct his error (if there had been one) and to thereby avoid sanctions. Whether
or not Dan would have utilized the "safe harbor" provisions is not material. Particularly
where, as here, Dan was appearing pro se, the opportunity should have been made available
to him. URCP 11 fs "safe harbor" provisions should be liberally construed to effect its
remedial purpose.
23. URCP 11 ?s Safe harbor should be liberally construed.

Counsel for Piper

attempts to excuse his failure to_afford Dan the 20 day "safe harbor" opportunity to withdraw
his pleadings [P. 27-29]. As a pro se litigant, even more reason existed for allowing Dan an
opportunity to withdraw the allegedly offensive pleadings. Whether Dan would have agreed
and withdrawn those pleadings is not material. The bottom line is, that no sanctions may be
imposed because Dan was not afforded the URCP 11(c)(1)(A) "safe harbor" opportunity.
24. URCP 11 sanctions may not be imposed for claims asserted in the complaint
which was drafted while Dan was a "represented party". URCP 11(c)(2)(A) specifically
prohibits imposition of monetary damages against a "represented party." Dan was a
"represented party" when the complaint was filed. Accordingly, sanctions cannot properly
be imposed against Dan for the claims asserted in the complaint.
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No affidavit required for Dan's URCP 59(e) motion
25. Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion did not require an affidavit. Piper's argument that
Dan's URCP 59(e) motion had to be supported by an affidavit is in error. Had there been a
trial, then as stated in URCP 59(a)(1) [irregularity in the proceedings of the court.. by which
either party was prevented from having a fair trial] might have required an affidavit. This
case was decided by summary judgment without a trial.

Nothing could have been

accomplished by filing an affidavit which merely recited that which was already in the
memoranda supporting the Motion for Summary Judgment, which was already well known
to Judge Medley, he having ruled on the motion for summary judgment. Piper's argument
re URCP 59(a)(4) is without merit. Dan's Motion was not based on newly discovered
evidence as contemplated thereby. Dan's good faith argument concerning gender bias
against fathers, denial of due process, etc. reflect his genuine belief

His free speech

arguments with respect thereto were appropriate and not sanctionable.
Dan's declaratory judgment claims were not Res judicata
26. URCP 11 sanctions against Dan should be vacated. Contrary to Piper's
argument [P. 22-24], Dan's right to again challenge the constitutionality of Utah's Divorce
Laws was no longer barred by Res judicata after the Troxel, supra decision. For the reasons
discussed above25 after the Troxel, supra decision, what effect the Troxel, supra decision had
on Utah's divorce laws was an undecided legal issue which was not barred byRes judicata.
25

For the sake of brevity, said arguments are not repeated here. They may be found in
discussion in If 5-10 and 14-18 above.
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Dan had a legal right to litigate that issue without being subject to sanctions. Dan's attempt
to clarify the effect Troxel, supra on Utah's divorce laws and/or to change those laws
specifically allowed under URCP 11(b)(2), et seq., were proper and do not subject him to
URCP 11 sanctions. The URCP 11 sanctions imposed on Dan by Judge Medley should be
vacated. Also see discussion in f 21-24 above.
27. Dan's URCP 59(e) Motion was proper. Denial of Dan's URCP 59(e) motion
was in error for the same reasons that the Court's granting of summary judgment dismissing
Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit was error. The Court should have corrected its error by
granting Dan's URCP 59(e) motion. See discussion in \ 3-10, 14-17,18, 21-25 above.
Piper's generalized and usupported statements such as Dan's "reliance on Troxel was
misplaced and frivolous" and that "quotes from cases cited are taken out of context [P. 27]
are insufficient and should be disregarded. Piper's argument that the Court allowed
sufficient time for the hearing misses the point. [P. 25]. Almost Vi hour of the allotted time
remained, however the Court cut Dan off and did not permit him to fully develop his
argument or his theory of the case. See discussion on P. 30-36 of Dan's opening brief.
28. Dan's rights under CJA 4-506 were denied. Whether CJA 4-506 is labeled as
"procedural" or "jurisdictional," Dan was entitled to be afforded the benefit of the "safe
harbor" provisions in URCP 11(b)(2) before sanctions were imposed. Speculation as to
whether he might have taken advantage of those provisions is not material. The bottom line
is that he because he was not afforded the "safe harbor" rights specified therein. Therefore,
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sanctions should not have been imposed and they should be vacated. See discussion in 122
above. The "safe harbor" provisions in URCP 11 should be liberally construed to effect their
remedial purpose. See discussion in 123 above. Imposition of sanctions for claims asserted
in the complaint are prohibited by URCP 11(c)(2)(A) because the complaint was drafted by
an attorney at a time when Dan was a "represented person" within the meaning of that rule.
See discussion in 124 above. The dispute over reasons for withdrawal by Dan's attorney are
immaterial and Piper's claims with respect thereto are hearsay. See discussion in f 11 above.
Attorney fee award should be vacated
29. Award of attorney fees is not authorized. Piper cites the Marshall case26 at P.
517 in support of her claim that she is entitled to be awarded attorney fees in connection with
both the proceedings in the trial Court and in connection with this appeal [P. 16, Par. 7].
Marshall supra, was a divorce case where attorney fees were authorized by statute and were
awarded pursuant to UC § 30-3-3 (1995). This is a suit for declaratory judgment, not a
divorce action, so the award of fees pursuant to the divorce statute is not authorized. Piper's
claim for attorney fees either at the trial level or on appeal should be denied.
V. CONCLUSION & RELIEF
For the reasons discussed above and in the opening brief, Dan respectfully requests
that this court grant the relief requested on P. 43-44 of the opening Brief summarized below
as follows:

26

Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2D 508, 517 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996).
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(1) The summary judgment dismissing Dan's declaratory judgment lawsuit should
be reversed;
(2) A ruling that the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Troxel, supra rendered Utah's
divorce laws unconstitutional, particularly as they were construed by this Court in its
Shinkoskey, supra decision;
(3) A review of the decision regarding the effect Troxel supra decision has on Utah's
divorce laws, particularly with respect to the right offitparents to make decisions concerning
their children and as to limitations on the divorce judge's right to overrule those decisions;
(4) URCP 11 sanctions should be vacated for the reasons stated above, including:
(a) a genuine unresolved dispute existed as to whether Troxel, supra overruled this Court's
11/4/99 decision in Case No. 990666 [App. A-l to Piper's brief] (b) whether the Troxel,
supra decision removed the Res judicata bar to further challenges to the constitutionality of
Utah's divorce laws so as to allow Dan to seek a ruling as to the effect of the Res judicata
decision, if any, on the constitutionality of Utah's divorce laws; (c) whether URCP 11(b)(2)
allowed Dan to make his argument for the "extension, modification or reversal of existing
law or the establishment of new law" without the chilling effect of URCP 11 sanctions for
doing so; (d) whether Dan is insulated from sanctions by URCP 11 (c)(2)(A), which precludes
imposition of sanctions on a "represented party" for "a violation of subdivision (b)(2), since
he was a "represented party" at the time that his complaint was filed, and (e) because of the
chilling effect on litigants efforts to challenge or expand existing laws; and,
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(5) Attorney fees awarded to Piper should be vacated because the divorce statute
relied upon by Piper is not applicable in this non-divorce case,27 and because award of
attorney fees is not authorized by the declaratory judgment statute. If the judgment is
reversed, then as a non-prevailing party Piper is not entitled to recover attorney fees. If fees
are awarded they should be awarded in Dan's favor.
Dated January 2, 2003.
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